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On a certification from the USDC S.D. Ohio, the

U.s. Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals [TECA] held that --~'?
the Economic Stabilization Act [Act] authorizes the
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authorizing a pay raise for the state's employees.

The

petition in this case and that in the related case, Ohio v.
United States (No. 73-839), challenges Congress' constitutional
power to control the wages and salaries of state government
employees.
2.

FACTS:

--

----

The United States brought suit pursuant to

--

the Act in the District Court seeking a permanent in'unction
..::..:.._

to prevent Ohio from violating the Act and the pertinent
Executive Order by paying salaries in excess of those authorized
by the Pay Board in its March 10, 1973 order.
undisputed.

The facts were

The new Ohio pay bill called for an average pay

increase of 10.6% for the 65,000 affected public employees.
In a mandamus proceeding shortly after the law's passage, the
Ohio courts ordered the Governor to pay the salaries.

Acting

upon an application by the State, the Federal Pay Board denied
the application for exception (from the 5.5% wage control
guidelines) to the extent the requested increase was in excess
of 7% for the current year.
3.

DECISION OF TECA:
a.

TECA first rejected the State's argument that

Congress did not intend in the Act to authorize control over
state wage and salary practices.

Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92,

, _____..-;}

99 (1946) (Congress need not expressly use the word "State" in
price regulation legislation in order to have intended that States
be subject to the statutory scheme).

While it was true that the

t"'\
\ cc/ '-------'

Act does not explicitly state that it applies to state governments,

c
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there is nothing looking the other way.

-

The Act's extensive

legislative
history unequivocally reveals that Congress
,_

---------

intended the salary and wage provisions to apply to state
and local governments.

-

In fact, Sen.:_tor Proxmire ~ amendment

II

on the floor to exempt them was debated and defeated 56-35.
------.

Moreover, the federal agencies charged by the Act with its
administration have consistently construed it in this manner.
b.

The Act, TECA held, was a legitimate exercise

of Congress' power to impose economic controls under the
Commerce Clause.

The Tenth Amendment was no obstacle.

v. O'Brien, ____ F.2d ____ (TECA Oct. 10, 1973).

Murphy

This case is

controlled by Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968),

~here

the Court upheld application of the Fair Labor Standards Act's
minimum wage and overtime provisions . to employees of stateoperated hospitals and schools.

While Congress lacks the power

to regulate all state activities under the guise of the
Commerce Clause, it does have the power to regulate certain
activities when it has a rational basis to conclude that they
substantially affect commerce.

Congres.s had such a rational

basis here for imposing temporary economic controls on state
and local government salaries.

Ohio has made no showing that

they have unreasonably interfered with its ability to function
as a sovereign state; nor has it demonstrated that the regulations
are invidiously discriminatory.
c.

The Ohio state court decision is

not~

judicata

simply because the United States was permitted to intervene there.

,.

- 4 Section 211 of the Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the
federal courts over the constitutionality of the Act and
the validity of any action taken under the Act.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs in No. 73-822 maintain that

the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from invading the sovereignty
of a state and directing what wages and
to state employees.

sa~aries

may be paid

Principal reliance is placed upon the

dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas in Maryland v. Wirtz, supra.
Petrs in No. 73-839 argue that Congress has exceeded its powers
under the Commerce Clause and invaded the province of state

.· 1/r

.;;:;
tv

governments by regulating state government pay practices, which,
petrs contend, affect the very scope, quality and adequacy of
the overall operation of the state government.

Petrs read

Maryland v. Wirtz to mean that Congress can only regulate those

·-

state activities which are or could be performed by private
~e.

392 U.S., at 196 n. 27.

Under TECA's rationale,

they see no logical way to stop 'Congress from legislatively
abolishing the states as effective instruments of government."
Petn., at 8.

They finally argue that Congress had no rational

basis for determining that the States' activity sought to be
regulated had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

They

argue that Congress never actually examined the alleged impact
that state wages and salaries could have upon inflation.
The SG points to Maryland v. Wirtz, where the Court put
to rest the Tenth Amendment argument, and further notes that
neither that case nor this one turns on whether the State was
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performing a proprietary vs. governmental function.
"[W]e look to the activities in
which the states have traditionally
engaged as marking the boundary of
the restriction upon the federal
taxing power. But there is no such
limitation upon the plenary power to
regulate commerce. The state can
no more deny the power if its exercise
has been authori~ed by Congress than
can an individual." United States v.
California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-185.
In exercising its commerce powers, Congress "may override
countervailing state interests whether these be described as
'governmental' or 'proprietary' in character."
Wirtz, supra, 392 U.S., at 195.

Maryland v.

The Act here does not regulate

the substantive performance of state functions.

To the extent

that they function in a capacity as employers, the States, like
their private counterparts, are restricted in the area
and salary increases.

o~

wage

The legislation is certainly rational:

to be effective in stabilizing the economy and limiting inflation,
it was imperative that all large employers, both public and
private, be subject to the regulation.
5.

DISCUSSION:

It would seem that the federal government

wins the argument hands down in view of Maryland v. Wirtz and
Congress' abundant power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
wages and salaries.

There would appear to be little need for

the Court to grant cert only to confirm this proposition.
There is a response.
)~
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States of California and Missouri are currently litigating
the question raised here. See United States v. Missouri, Civ. No.
1888 (W.D . Mo.); United States v. California, Civ. No . S74-186,
preliminary injunction granted May I 7, I 974 (E. D . Calif.). Apparently there is only one other action involving public employees,
and the constitutional question presented here has not been raised
in that case. County of Nassau, New York v. Cost of Living
Council, Civ. No. 74-C-618 (E.D. N.Y.).

2The

As orginally enacted, the Act would have expired on February 28, 1971. See Section 206 of the Act, 84 Stat. 800. The Act
was then extended five times. 84 Stat. 1468; 85 Stat. 13; 85 Stat.
38; 85 Stat. 743; 87 Stat. 27. The final extension was to April 30,
1974.

1

The general question of the federal government's power
under the Commerce Clause to subject the States to
commercial or economic regulation may of course arise
in the future under different statutes. But we believe
that this Court should reserve consideration of that
general question until it arises in the context of an operative regulatory scheme of broad and continuing significance.

It appears unlikely that there will be · significant litigation involving wages and salaries of state employees
under the Act. The question presented here is at issue
in only two other pending actions.2 We have been informed by the Cost of Living Council that no proceedings raising this issue are pending before it. And no
litigation of this nature can arise with respect to wages
and salaries paid for periods after April 30, 1974.
See Section 218 of the Act, as amended, 87 Stat. 29. The
issue in this case, therefore, has no substantial continuing importance.

permitted the Economic Stabilization Act to exp1re
at midnight on April 30, 1974. 1

2
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List 1, Sheet 5
No. 73-822

Motion to Dismiss Writ
of Certiorari

FRY

v.
U NITED STATES
The Court granted cert to TECA in this case on February 19,
19 7 4 in order to review the question of whether the lOth Amcnclr:ncnt bars
the fede ra1 government from. enforcing against the States, in their capaci ti"-as employers, gene ra1 regulations of conunerce that affect governn1 ental
and nongovcrrunenta1 en.J.ploycrs alike.

Tbe issue arises in the context of

t he Economic Stabilization Act '..Vhich Jin1itcd the extent to which Ohio coulc"!.
increase the sala rics of its public cnlp1oyecs .
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Noting that the /\ct expired on /\pril 30, the SG moves to clismis::-:
the writ on the ground tbo.t the case no longer has prospective importance.
Th e SG advises that the issue is raised in only two other pending actions
[U.S. v. Mo. (W.D. Mo.) and U.S. v. Calif. (E. D. Cal.)] and that he has

--

--

--

---

been infonned by the Cost of Living Council that no proceedings raising this
issue are pending before it.

Conceding that the issue could arise in the

future under different statutes, the SG' suggests tha,t the Court should
reserve consideration of the issue w1.til it arises in the contc t of an operati\-_
regulatory s chcme of broad and continuing significance.
Morri s v.

Wetnb.~2·ger,

Tbe SG cites

410 U.S. 422; Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349

U.S. 70; and District of Columbia v. Sweeney, 310 U.S. 631, in support of
his motion.
DISCUSSION : In Morr1s, the Court, after argument, disn1.issed the
writ as improvid ently granted.

The Court noted that 2 0 days after the '' rit

had been granted, Congress amended the relevant statutory provisions of
the Social Security Act there in issue.
refusal to bury an Indian.

Ric e concerned a private cemetery! s

Upon rehearing, five members of the Court

disrni ssed the writ on the ground that, after com.mencernent of the, ction.
the State enacted a statute prohibiting cemeteries from denying burial on
account of race.

Although the statute was, by its t enns , not applicable to

pending actions, the Court noted that it made the case one of ''iso1 ated
significance.

11

In a memo decision in Swecney, the Court denied cert

"in vie\v of tbc fact that the tax is laic1

111

cr a statute '\vhich has been re-

pealed and the question is therefore not of public irnportance.
There is no response.
Ginty
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Penny Clark
No. 73-822

DATE:

November 8, 1974

Fry v. United States

The issues in this case are whether Congress intended
to subject state salaries to wage and price controls under
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 and whether, if it
did, its action was constitutional.
The SG argues that the issue of coverage is not
properly before the Court because it was not raised in the
petition for certiorari.

This is a very mechanical approach,

since it would be inappropriate to reach the constitutional
question without first resolving the issue of coverage.

The

SG has briefed the issue, and even though petitioners themselves have not addressed it, the TECA decided it, and several
{i~~lu~'tt.. St:lt~ ~ O~o)

amici ~have

briefed it as well.

The Court has deferred consideration of the SG's motion
to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
The SG notes that the Economic Stabilization Act expired
after cert was granted, and argues that the issue is no longer
of major importance.

[It is not moot, because Ohio has been

enjoined from paying a total of $10.5 million to its employees.
There is a suggestion that, if the injunction were dissolved,
Ohio would pay back wages to its employees.]

Petitioner says

2.
that the SG is taking an inconsistent position by petitioning
for cert in an Economic Stabilization Act case that the
Government lost in California, but the clerk's office tells
me no such petition has been filed (as of 11/8/74).
The coverage issue isn't crystal clear, but it does
seem that Congress intended to include state employees.
The Act is exceptionally broad, with almost no exceptions,
and it even leaves the definition of "wages" to the administrative
process.

The only strong argument that state salaries should

not be included is the doctrine that statutes should not be

-

presumed to include sovereigns unless they say so explicitly.
This doctrine has been undermined in several of this Court's
cases, and like other doctrines of statutory interpretation,
is resorted to only for ambiguous statutes.

The Senate's

\

rejection of a floor amendment exempting state employees is /
a strong indicator of congressional intent and probably

/

~

J

makes the presumption unnecessary.
The constitutional issue is largely governed by Maryland
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).

There the Court reaffirmed

the doctrine that Congress, acting within a delegated power
(i.e., the commerce power) may override countervailing state
interests.

The Court rejected the analogy to cases adopting

the governmentalJ'propietary distinction as a limit on
Congress's power to tax state activities.

The issue is

simply whether the legislation is an "otherwise valid regulation

3.
of commerce."

Noting that the Court has power to keep

Congress from destroying the states, the Court held:
But while the commerce power has limits, valid
general regulations of commerce do not cease to be
regulations of commerce because a State is involved.
If a State is engaging in economic activities that
are validly regulated by the Fe eraL Government
when engaged in by private persons, the State too
may be forced to conform its activities to federal
regulation.
392 U.S. at 196-197.

Justices Douglas and Stewart dissented,

saying that requiring the state to pay minimum wages to its
hospitals and schools gave the federal government too much
power over state budgetary policy.

They would have applied

the governmental/proprietary distinction of the tax cases.
The petitioners argue that control over state wages
threatens the very existence of state government.
vastly overstate their case.

They

When wages in all sectors of

the economy are under controls, applying the same controls
to state wages is unlikely to cause a mass exodus from the
state civil service.

While the state has a strong

interest/~

in setting its own employment policies, a temporary freeze
on wages is a minor interference.
I think the rule suggested in Maryland v. Wirtz is a
good solution to the conflict between the state's interests
and the federal interests.

Taking a narrow view of the quoted

passage, it suggests that in the absence of special circum-

such a

stances, a state may be included in a regulatory program of

-

general applicability.

---

There is little danger that

4.
rule would allow Congress to interfere substantially in state
governance.

The special problems of legislation aimed directly

at the states can be dealt with under other principles, such
as those prompting the limits on federal power to tax state
activities.
The governmental/proprietary distinction is on its way
out of other areas of law, primarily because a number of state
activities fit neither of

two

aac.tl~:t

the~categoriesA(e.g.,

hospitals, public utilities).

transportation,

Moreover, it is not especially

well suited to commerce-clause principles.

For example,

the federal commerce power nullifies certain kinds of state
taxes on interstate commerce.

The taxation power is integral

to the existence of any state government, but the needs of
interstate commerce have been deemed to justify federal
interference.
Recommendations
Although the constitutional issue has lost immediate
importance with the expiration of the Economic Stabilization
Act, there is still a lot of money involved.

Since the case

can probably be decided under Maryland v. Wirtz, I would
recommend reaching the merits.tlllllllll.................
On the merits, I would
first decide the coverage issue in favor of the Government
and then affirm on a Maryland v. Wirtz rationale.

5.
The State of Ohio's petition for cert in this case is
still pending, No. 73-839.

The SG raises a point of time-

liness, arguing that the petition was untimely because it was
filed under an extension and the statute authorizing
certiorari from TECA does not provide for extensions.
§

2ll(g), 85 Stat. 750.

Act

I have found no general statute or

rule that would authorize an extension, so I think the SG
is right.

Since the time is prescribed by statute, the

tardiness would be jurisdictional.

But, since the issues can

be resolved under this petition, an order denying Ohio's
'
petition will
be academic.

P.C.
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No. 73--822

STNNiilated:

Reoiroulated:

Ernest Fry aud Thelma] On Writ of Certiorari to the
Boehm, Petitioners,
Temporary Emergency
v.
Court of Appeals of the
United States.
United States.
[January -, 1975]
Mn. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 1 authorized
the President to issue orders and regulations to stabilize
wages and salaries at levels not less than those prevailing
on May 25, 1970. By Executive Order, the President
created the Pay Board to oversee wage and salary controls imposed m~der the Act's authorization. ~xecutive
Order 11627, 36 Fed. Reg. 20136. In implementing the
wage stabilizatiqn program, the Pay Board issJ.Ied regulations that limited annual salary increases for covered
employees to 5.5cy'o and required prior Board approval
for all salary adjustments affecting 5,000 or more employees.2 The State of Ohio subsequently enaqted legislation providing for a 10.6% wage and salary increa~,
effective January 1, 1972, for almost 65,000 state employees.3 The State applied to the Pay Eoard for
1

Pub. L. 91-379, Aug. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, 12
U. S. C. § 1204 (Supp. I 1G70). The Act was extended five times
before it expired on April 30, 1974
2 6 CFR §§201.10; 101.21 ( 1972)
See also id., § 101.28.
3
OhiO Revised Code § 143 102 (A), as amended, § 124.15 (A}
(1972). The Act provided for ~alary mcrt>ast>s for employees of the
state government, state umversities, &nd county welfare departments.
Elected :;iute officials were not included.

lrtN
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approval of the increases, and a public hearing was held.
In Mareh 1972, the Board denied the application for an
exemption to the extent that it exceeded salary increases
of 7% for the 1972 wage year. 4 Petitioners, two state
employees, sought a writ of mandamus, in state court to
compel Ohio officials to pay the full increases provided
in the state Pay Bill Act. The Ohio Supreme Court
granted the writ and ordered the increases to be paid.
Fry v. Ferguson, 34 Ohio St. 2d 252, 298 N. E. 2d 129
(1973).
After the State Supreme Court decision, the United
States filed this action in the District Court to enjoin
Ohio and its officials from paying wage and salary
increases in excess of the 7o/r authorized by the Pay
Board. The District Court certified to the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals the question of the appHcability of federal wage and salary controls to state
employees. See 12 U. S. C. §§ H)04, 211 (c) (1970
Supp. I).
The Court of Appeals construed the Act as applying
to state employees and as such upheld its constitutionality. United States v. Ohio, 487 F. 2d 936 (T. E. C. A.
1973). Relying on the decisions of this Court in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), and United States v.
Californ:ia, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), the court concluded that
the interference with sta.te affairs incident to the uniform
implementation of federal aconomic controls was of no
consequence since Congress had a rational basis upon'
Which to conclude that the state activity substantially
'1 The. Pay Board determined that the implementation of the pay
increase from March 1972 to November 1972 would reduce the
effective ratt· to 7% for the wage year November 14, 1971, to
November 13, 1972. The payments in issue here therefore represent
the wages and salanes that., were due from .January 1, 1972, when
the pay increa:se was to take effect, to March 16, 1972. The tota!.
ll,Ulount involved is $10.5nullion.
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affected commerce. The Court of Appeals accordingly
enjoined the payment of wage and salary increases in
excess of the amount authorized by the Pay Board. We
affirm.

I
At the outset, it is contended that Congress did not
intend to include state employees within the reach of
the Economic Stabilization Act and that the Pay Board
therefore did not have the authority to regulate the compensation due state employees.~ We disagree. The language and legislative history of the Act leave no doubt
that Congress intended that it apply to employees
throughout the economy, including those employed by
state and local governments. The Act contemplated
general stabilization of "prices, rents, wages, salaries,
dividends, and interest," 12 U. S. C. §§ 1904, 202, and
it provided that the controls should "call for generally
comparable sacrifices by business and labor as well as
other segments of the economy." I d., ~ 203 (b) ( 5). It
contained no exceptions for employees of any governmental bodies, even at the federal leveJ.6 The failure
5 Petitioners did not ra1se the ~tatutory ~~~ue either in their pebtlon for certioran or in their bnrf. Rather than drcide a constitutional question when there may be doubt whether there is any statutory basis for it, howrver, W(' deal first w1th thr t>tatutory question,
wh1ch is addressed in the bnefs of amici curiae serking reversal.
6 Congress did provide for thr exemption of certain categories of
employees, such as member:; of the workmg poor, those earning substandard wages, and those entitled to wagr incrrases under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. 12 (T. S C.§ 1904, §§ 20:3 (d), (f) (Supp. I,
1970) See al~o td., §§2Ga (c)(l)-(3) (f)(2)(3), and (g). The
var10us stabilization agenciC'l:! have uniformly interpreted the Act to
include thr States w1thin 1ts scope, ~ee 36 Fed. Reg. 21790, td., at
25420; :37 Fed Rt>g. 1240; uf., at 24961; id., at 24989-24991 We
have long rrcognized that the mterpretation of a statute by an
implmwntmg agency i::; entitled to great weight Udall v. Tallman.
aso F. s. "1, lo-u~ (1965),
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of the Act to make express reference to the States does
not warrant the inference that controls may not be
extended to their employees. See Case v. Bowles, 327
U.S. 92, 99 (1946); United States v. California, 297 U.S.,
at 186. Indeed, in framing the Act, Congress specifically
rejected an amendment that would have exempted employees of state and local governments. 117 Cong. Rec.
43673-43677. And the Senate Committee Report makes
it plain that the Committee considered and rejected a
proposed exemption for the same group. S. Rep. No.
92-507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1971). It is clear, then,
that Congress intended to reach state and local governmental employees. The only' remaining question is
whether it could do so consistent with the constitutional
Umitations on its power.
II
Petitioners acknowledge that Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause is very broad. Even activity that
is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by
Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct
by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the
States or with foreign nations. See Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United State.<;, 379 U. S. 241, 255 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128 (1942).
There is little difficulty m concluding that such an effect
could well result from large wage increases to 65,000
employees in Ohio and similar numbers in other States.
' PeWiciflers do not appear to challenge Congress' conclusion that unrestrained wage increases, even for employees of wholly intrastate operations, could have a.
Significant effect on commerce. Instead, they contend
that applying the Economic Stabilization Act to state
employees interferes with sovereign state functions and
for that reason the Commerce Clause should not be read

,.
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to permit regulation of all state and local governmental
employees. 7
On the facts of this case, this argument is foreclosed
by our decision in Jl1aryland v. Wirtz, supra, where we
held that the Fair Labor Standards Act could constitutionally be applied to schools and hospitals run by a
State. Wirtz reiterated the principle that States are not
immune from all federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause merely because of their sovereign status. 392
U. S., at 196-197. We noted, moreover, that the statutory regulation in Wirtz was quite limited in character.
The "interference" with sovereign sta.te functions went
only so far as to provide that when a State employs
people to perform functions normally covered by the
Fair Labor Standards Act, "it is subject to the same
restrictions as a wide range pf other employers whose
activities affect commerce, including privately operated
I!!Chools and hospitals." !d., at 194. In this case, the
interference with state sovereignty is similarly limitecfin
nature. The wage restrictions were not directed particu ..
larly at the States, but included the States in a plenary
scheme, the comprehensiveness of which was judged
essential to its success. Nor did the regulation affect
the manner in which state officials could perform their
Petitioners have st11ted their argument not in terms of the Com~
merce power, but in terms of the limitations on that power imposed
by the Tenth Amendment. While the Tenth Amendment has been
characterizt>d as a "truism," stating merely that "all is retained
which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, 312 U. S,
100, 124 (1941), it is not without significanct>. The Amendment
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
t>xercise power in a fashion t.h at impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system. Despite the
extravagant claims on thiS Bcore made by some amici, we are convinced that the wage re:;triction regulations constitutf'd no such
drastic invasion of fltate sovereignty,
7

.1\i:•
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duties. As in Wirtz, the federal regulations merely
limited jhe wages and salaries paid to state employees:
it did-not purport to,.(impose substantive restrictions on
the functions the States could perform or otherwise to
affect the way state employees carry out their work.
Petitioners seek to distinguish Maryland v. Wirtz on
the ground that the employees in that case pefformed
primarily "proprietary" functions, while those subject
to the wage regulations in this case performed both "proprietary" and "governmental" functions. But this Court
rejected a similar attempted distinction as early as
United States v. California, 297 U. S., at 183, where the
Federal Safety Appliance Act was held applicable to an
intrastate railroad owned by the State of California.
Indeed, we reiterated the same view in Wirtz its~lf. See
392 U. S., at 195.
We conclude that the Economic Stabilization Act was
constitutional as applied to state and local governmental
employees. Since the Ohio wage legislation conflicted
with the Pay Board's ruling, under the Supremacy Clause
the State must yield to the federal mandate. See Public
Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 542545 (1958); Murphy v. O'Brien, 485 F. 2d 671, 675
(T. E . C. A. 1973).
Affirmed.
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CHAMI!IERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January 6, 1975

Re:

No. 73-822 - Fry v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

January 6, 1975

Re: No. 73-822, Fry v. United States
Dear Thurgood,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

January 9, 1975

Dear Thurgood:
Re:

No. 73-822 -

Please join me.

Sincerely,~ •

l[!,.

Mr. Justice Marshall

...

."

,.,

Fry, et al. v. United States

-

No. 73-822

United

Dear Thurgood:
. As I mentioned at Friday's Conference, I have refrained
from joining you in En because of concern as to its effect
on National League o~ities v. Brennan and california v.
Brennan.
'jt·'

There were at least five, perhaps six of us, Who
indicated that we will vote to note these cases. I have
reread your circulation in ~, and it seems to me that in
its present form ~ would mike it difficult for us to
consider National~ague of Cities with genuine freedom to
decide it on its own merits. PUtting it differently, !II.
(as now written) will strengthen the force of Wirtz as a
precedent and possibly be viewed as extending Wirtz.

,· ·li>.,

'

In my view, EEl: need not constitute an extention or
even an endorsement of lvirtz. The Economic Stabilization
Act was addressed to a national emergency regarded by
everyone as being temporary in character. No one supposed
that the wage and price freeze was permanent legislation
comparable to the Fair Labor Standards Act. As you point
out in your opinion, the freeze applied as an emergency
measure across the board to all wages and salaries both
public and private. It was an extraordinary exercise of
commerce clause power, designed to meet an emergency. I
would gladly join an opinion focused primarily on this '
aspect of the case.
'

On page 5 of your draft in En you point out, quite
aorrectly, that Wirtz was "limitiClin character'-: and that
it applied only to state employees who "performed functions
normally covered by the Fair T..abor Standards Act," namely,

.

' '

!'
.h.

i.

...

- 2 employees in privately operated schools and hospitals.
leaves open the possibility of distinguishing Wirtz in
" National League of Cities.
· ln the last paragraph in your draft (p. 6), you conclude,
that there is no merit to the distinction between "proprietary"
and "governmental" functions so far as the Fair Labor Standards
Act is concerned. It is true that \virtz so indicated in a
dictum. But I am unwilling to go so far, at least until we
;, .
have considered oral arguments and briefs in National League
of Cities v. Brennan.
,

In summary, if you are disposed to write ~ someWhat
more narrowly, emphasizing the national emergency and its
temporary nature, and eliminating or modifying the next to
the last paragraph with respect to proprietary functions,
I will happily join you now. Otherwise, I suggest we hold
f!Y. for National League of Cities.
If ~ comes down in its present form, I am afraid the
the Court Will have gone a long way to pre-judge National
League of Cities.
Sincerely,

.:§u.vrtmt <!Jnurt nf t4t ~tb .:§ta:Us
~a:sJri:ngton. Ill· <!J. 21lc?~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 14, 1975

Re:

No. 73-822 -Fry v. United States ·

Dear Thurgood:
I am substantially in accord
expressed to you in his letter of
offer you the same assurance that
your part, would procure my vote,
in its present form and if no one
or concurrence, I probably will.
few days and let you know.

with the sentiments Lewis
January 14th~ I cannot
a narrower rendition, on
but I can't join the opinion
else writs:; either a dissent
I will decide in the next

Sincerely/
.•

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

January 15, 1975

Re:

No. 73-822 -

Fry v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
I have already joined your opinion in this case
and you have a court. There is much to be said, however,
for Lewis' point of view 1 set forth in his letter to you of
January 14. This note is just to state that it is all right
with me if you wish to accommodate him.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall

cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 16, 197 5

/

No. 73-822 -- Fry v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I have read and reread your note concerning this case. I have
considered your suggestions along with a rereading of my opinion
and regret that I cannot agree with you.

Fry was carefully cut to the bone and about as narrow a holding
as I can imagine. That was true before National League of Cities
came along, and, I submit is true now.
You are correct about one dECision affecting a later case. Since
both sides of the case heard on Tuesday cited our opinion in the
I. T. T. case handed down an hour or so before, maybe we should
have held up the I. T. T. opinion.
More than that, I fear if we follow your suggestions we will be
doing just what you fear: we will indeed be prejudging National League
of Cities.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

<!Jottrlllf tqt ~tb ~taftg
j)rrurlying~ ~. <!J. 2llc?>l$
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

January 17, 1975

Re:

Fry v. United States - No. 73-822

Dear Thurgood:
I will circulate a dissent in this case. I am
sorry to have taken so long to fish or cut bait, and
will do my best to get it out during the week after
next.
Sincerely,

{.lv~

cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

February 11, 1975

.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Dear Thurgood:
Re:

Fry v. United States, No. 73-822.

Please add at the end of your opinion in Fry v. Unites States
the following statement.
Less than three months after we granted certiorari,

Congress

allowed the Economic Stabilization Act to expire on April 30,

1974 .

There is therefore no continuing impediment to the

payment of salary increases of the kind at issue in this case.
I would therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference
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Temporary Emergency Court
v.
of Appeals of the United
United States.
. States.

[March -, 1975]

MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
I am persuaded that principles of federalism impose
some limits on direct congressional regulation of state
government, but I do not think they have been exceeded in
this case. In 1970 Congress enacted the Economic Stabilization Act as an emergency measure to counter severe
infh.tion that threatened the national economy. H. R.
Rep. No. 91-1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-11 (1970).
The method it chose, under the Commerce Clause, was
to give the President authority to freeze virtually all
wages and prices, including the wages of state and local
government employees. In 1971, when the freeze was
activated, state and local government employees com-·
posed 147c of the Nation's work force. Brief for the
United States, at 20. It seems inescapable that the
effectiveness of federal action would have been drastically
i.mpaired if wage increaseo to this sizeable group of
employees were left outside the reach of these emergency
federal wage controls.
Although the Issue is not free from doubt, I am willing·
to sustaiu the action of Congress under the circumstances;
Qi this. case,

~ttmt
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

March 20, 1975

Re: No. 73-822 -

Fry v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your separate concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

March 20, 1975

Re:

No. 73-822

-

Fry v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
I expressed to you some time ago my discomfort
with the implications of the opinion, and in my note of
January 15 I indicated my sympathy with Lewis 1 point of
view as set forth in his letter of the preceding day.
I have now determined that my views coincide
with those of Lewis. I am therefore joining his separate
concurrence and am withdrawing my joinder in your opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall

cc:

The Conference

·.~

Chie~u~;~

To: The
Mr. Just
Mr. Just ce
Kr. Justice
Kr. Justice
Kr. Justice
Mr. Justice
~Kr. Justioe

~as

Brennan
Stewart
White
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist

From: Marshall, J.
Circulated:

-------

Recirculated:

MAR 2 7 1975

3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
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No. 73-822
Ernest Fry and Thelma) On Writ of Certiorari to the
Boehm, Petitioners,
Temporary Emergency
v.
Court of Appea.Is of the
United States.
United States.
[January - , 1975]
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the judgment of the
Court.
The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 1 authorized
the President to issue orders and regulations to stabilize
wages and salaries at levels not less than those prevailing
on May 25, 1970. By Executive Order, the President
created the Pay Board to oversee wage and salary controls imposed under the Act's authorization. Executive
Order 11627, 36 Fed. Reg. 20136. In implementing the
wage stabilization program, the Pay Board issued regulations that limited annual salary increases for covered
employees to 5.5% and required prior Board approval
for all salary adjustments affecting 5,000 or more employees.2 The Stat-a of Ohio subsequently enacted legislation providing for a 10.6% wage and salary increase,
effective January 1, 1972, for almost 65,000 state employees. 3 The State applied to t'ne Pay Board for
1

~~
~ ~

?L

~

~ ~

Pub. L. 91-379, Aug. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, note '
1
following 12 U.S. C.§ 1904 (1970 ed Supp. I). The Act was ex&w.J-- ~ /rl~ .
tended five times before 1t cxpmd on April 30, 1974.
_. ,_,
2 6 CFR §§ 201.10, 101.21 (1972) .
See also id., § 101.28.
~
~
1
8 Ohio Revised Code § 143.102 (A), as amended, § 124.15 (A)
•
•. _-..J
I
(1972) . The Act provided for salary increases for employees of the ~ ~ a_
state government, state umverslties, and county welfare departments. (/f)__ ~J J"'!..i~.i~--~ . _...
Elected state official!! were not included,

9-

"'-y- .......---r--....c.c
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approval of the increases, and a public hearing was held.
In March 1972, the Board denied the application for an
exemption to the extent that it exceeded salary increases
of 7% for the 1972 wage year. 4 Petitioners, two state
employees, sought a writ of mandamus in state court to
compel Ohio officials to pay the full increases provided
in the state Pay Bill Act. The Ohio Supreme Court
granted the writ and ordered the increases to be paid.
Fry v. Ferguson, 34 Ohio St. 2d 252, 298 N. E. 2d 129
(1973).
After the State Supreme Court decision, the United
States filed this action in the District Court to enjoin
Ohio and its officials from paying wage and salary
increases in excess of the 7% authorized by the Pay
Board. The District Court certified to the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals the question of the applicability of federal wage and salary controls to state
employees. See ~ 211 (c) of the Economic Stabilization \
Act, note following 12 U. S. C.~ 1904 (1970 ed. Supp. I).
The Court of Appeals construed the Act as applying
to state employees and as such upheld its constitutionality. United States v. Ohio, 487 F. 2d 936 (T. E. C. A.
1973). Relying on the decisions of this Court in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), and United States v,
California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), the court concluded that
the interference with state affairs incident to the uniform
implementation of federal economic controls was of no
consequence since Congress had a rational basis upon
which to conclude that the state activity substantially
' The Pay Board determined that the implementation of the pay
increase from March 1972 to November 1972 would reduce the
effective rate to 7% for the wage year November 14, 1971, to
November 13, 1972. The payments in issue here therefore represent
the wages and salaries that were due from January 1, 1972, when
the pay increase was to take effect, to March ~6, 1972. Th, tot_a.)
amo~mt involved is $10.5 milliou.
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affected commerce. The Court of Appeals accordingly
enjoined the payment of wage and salary increases in
excess of the amount authorized by the Pay Board. We
affirm.
I
At the outset, it is contended that Congress did not
intend to include state employees within the reach of
the Economic Stabilization Act and that the Pay Board
therefore did not have the authority to regulate the compensation due state employees.~ We disagree. The language and legislative history of the Act leave no doubt
that Congress intended that it apply to employees
throughout the economy, including those employed by
state and local governments. The Act contemplated
general stabilization of "prices, rents, wages, salaries, \
dividends, and interest," § 202, note following 12 U. S. C.
§ 1904, and it provided that the controls should "call for
generally comparable sacrifices by business and labor as
well as other segments of the economy." Id., at § 203
(b)(5). It contained no exceptions for employees of any
governmental bodies, even at the federal level. 6 The
15 Petitioners did not raise the statutory issue either in their petition for certiorari or in their brief. Rather than decide a constitutional question when there may be doubt whether there is any statutory ba~is for it, however, we deal first with the statutory question,
which is addressed in the briefs of amici curiae seeking reversal.
6 Congress did provide for the exemption of certain categories of
employees, such as members of the working poor, those earning substandard wages, and those entitled to wage increases under the Fair \
Labor Standards Act . §§203 (d), (f). See also §§203 (c)(l)-(3),
(f) (2) (3), and (g) . The various stabilization agencies have uniformly
interpreted the Act to include the States w1thin its scope, ~:;ee 36 Fed.
Reg. 21790; td .. at 25420; 37 Fed. Reg. 1240 ; id., at 24961; id., at
24989-24991. We have long recognized that the interpretation of a
statute by an unplrmenting agrncy i~:; entitled to great weight.
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-18 (1965).
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failure of the Act to make express reference to the States
does not warrant the inference that controls may not be
extended to their employees. See CfU3e v. Bowles, 327
U.S. 92, 99 (1946); United States v. California, 297 U.S.,
at 186. Indeed, in framing the Act, Congress specifically
rejected an amendment that would have exempted employees of state and local governments. 117 Cong. Rec.
43673-43677. And the Senate Committee Report makes
it plain that the Committee considered and rejected a
proposed exemption for the same group. S. Rep. No.
92-507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1971). It is clear, then,
that Congress intended to reach state and local overnmenta
J?!Oyees.
e on y remaining question is
whether it could do so consistent with the constitutional
limitations on its power.
II

.

,

Petitioners acknowledge that Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause is very broad. Even activity that
is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by
Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct
by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the·
States or with foreign nations. See Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 255 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127- 128 (1942).
There is little difficulty in concluding that such an effect
could well result from large wage increases to 65,000'
employees in Ohio and similar numbers in other States,
e. g., general raises to state employees could inject millions of dollars of purchasing power into the economy
and might exert pressure on other segments of the work
force to demand comparable increases.
Petitioners do not appear to challenge Congress' conclusion that unrestrained wage increases, even for employees of wholly intrastate operations, could have a
significant effect on commerce. Instead, they contend

l
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that applying the Economic Stabilization Act to state
employees interferes with sovereign state functions and
for that reason the Commerce Clause should not be read
to permit regulation of all state and local governmental
employees. 7
On the facts of this case, this argument is foreclosed
by our decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, where we
held that the Fair Labor Standards Act could constitutionally be applied to schools and hospitals run by a
State. Wirtz reiterated the principle that States are not
immune from all federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause merely because of their sovereign status. 392
U. S., at 196-197. We noted, moreover, that the statute
at issue in Wirtz was quite limited in-application.
The federal regulation in this case is even less intrusive. Congress enacted the Economic Stabilization
Act as an emergency measure to counter severe inflation
a t reatened t e na ional economy. H. R.
Rep. No. 91-1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-11 (1970).
The method it chose, under the Commerce Clause, was
to give the President authority to freeze virtually all
wages and prices, including the wages of state and local
government employees. In 1971, when the freeze was
activated, state and local government employees com~
posed 14% of the Nation's work force. Brief for the
1 Petitioners have stated theit argument not in terms of the Commerce power, but in terms of the limitations on that power imposed
by the Tenth Amendment. While the Tenth Amendment has been
characterized as a "truism," stating merely that "all is retained
which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, 312 U. S.
100, 124 (1941), it is not w1thout significance. The Amendment
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively m a federal system. Despite the
extravagant claims on this score made by some amici, we are convinced that the wage restriction regulations constituted no &lildh
drAStic invASion of state sovereignty.

l
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United States, at 20. It seems inescapable that the (
effectiveness of federal action would have been drastically
impaired if wage increasef> to this sizeable group of
employees were left outside the reach of these emergency
federal wage controls.
We conclude that the Economic Stabilization Act was
constitutional as applied to state and local governmental
employees. Since the Ohio wage legislation conflicted
with the Pay Board's ruling, under the Supremacy Clause
'the State must yield to the federal mandate. See Public
Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 542545 (1958); Murphy v. O'Brien, 485 F. 2d 671, 675
(T. E . C. A. 1973).
Affirmed.

MR.

JusTICE DouGLAS.

Less than three months after we granted certiorari,
Congress allowed the Economic Stabilization Act to expire on April 30, 1974. There is therefore no continuing
impediment to the payment of salary increases of the
kind at issue in this case. I would therefore dismiss the
writ as improvidently granted.

~u.vumt <!fourl

of tltt ~~ j;ta:teg

1Jaafrhtgtlltt, ~. <!J. 2ll,;t'!~
C HAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 27, 1975
PERSONAL

Re:

73-822 - Fry v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I can join your limited concurrence
in the above if you can see your way to insert
the words ''temporary emergency" after
"President" on the 9th line of you·r opinion.
The powers were both temporary and
emergency, and I think it crucial to hit
this aspect "hard" to avoid implications as
to our next case in this area.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: Mr. Justice Blackmun

~ttpTtltU <!Jourl of tq.t ~ttif.tb j)'mitg
'Jta:glritt-gfmt.18. <!J. 2ll.?J!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

j

April 7, 19 7 5

Re:

No. 7 3 - 8 2 2

-

F ry v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
If you will permit me, I am glad to join your re-

circulation of March 27.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall

cc:

The Conference

I

'

April 8, 1975

No.

73~822

Fry v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
In view of the changes made in your circulation of
March 27, I am happy to withdraw my concurring opinion and
join you.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
lfp/aa
cc:

Tbe Conference

~_:1

'h

Dear Chief:

As Thurgood substantially incorporated my concurrence
in his opinion, and omitted the most objectionable language
from ,bis prio,!, drafts, I am joining hia.
"", .,_, ,.:' ,, ~~.
\

\

Perhaps he will uke the change suggested in your 'iJ
letter to me of March 27, if you request it, although I
really do not think this is necessary
'

.._,

\..;,.../

<!Jottrlllf tqt ~~ .;§taftg
~ufring-htt4 ~. <!J. 21l.?'l>;J

.:§ttpTtntt

CHAM6ERS OF"

THE CH I EF JUSTICE

May 23, 1 975

Re:

7 3 -822 - Fry v. U. S.

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me .
Regards,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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